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Under the UCC, as under the prior law as to subse-
quent creditors, the creditor is protected only if he is
ignorant of prior unperfected interest in the chattel;2'
knowledge on his part prevents him from gaining priority
regardless of whether he is "diligent in attaching". On
the other hand, the rights of the holder of a purchase money
security interest remain unaffected by any knowledge he
may have concerning the existence of other creditors, and
his rights are determined solely by the timeliness of his
filing. This result encourages a free flow of credit sales by
protecting a "secured party" vendor merely if he is diligent
in filing. If there is no timely filing of a purchase money
security interest, a general creditor may, by attachment,
obtain a prior lien on the goods sold to the debtor, unless
he knows of the conditional sale and consequently could
not have been misled by any ostensible ownership of
the debtor.
BERRYL A. SPEERT
Fiduciary Duty And Implied Promises
In Prospectus
United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Products, Inc.'
The Carter Products Company, prior to July, 1957, was
a closely held corporation engaged in the manufacture and
marketing of proprietary and toiletry articles. The prin-
cipal and controlling interest in the company was held by
H. H. Hoyt, who had been encouraged by a large minority
interest to establish a public market for the Carter stock.
The company filed a registration statement with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission on July 1, 1957, and the
preliminary and final prospectuses were distributed to the
public for the purpose of publicizing the sale.2 Included
possession of the vehicle and has not thereafter relinquished possession of
the vehicle. Previously, tax liens on motor vehicles were valid if notice
thereof was filed in an office designated by state law or with the clerk of
the United States District Court in the judicial district in which the
property was situated.
2 Lack of knowledge was also required of the judgment creditor under
the old act. Laws of Md. 1951, ch. 577, § 71.
DAILY RMcOR, September 23, 1963 (Md. 1963).
2 The reader should note that the prospectus referred to herein is the
one in effect at the conclusion of the so-called "waiting period", which
normally extends twenty days from the date of filing. The preliminary
and summary prospectuses do not give rise to either contractual or tort
liability prior to the effective date of registration. I LOSS, SECUITIEs
REGULATION 182 (2d ed. 1961) ; 3 LOSS, SEOUTIEs REGULATION 1722 (2d
ed. 1961).
UNITED FUNDS v. CARTER
in the prospectus was the statement, "The Company in-
tends to make application for the listing of Common Stock
on the New York Stock Exchange." Listing on the Ex-
change was achieved in October of 1957, subsequent to the
effective date of registration. Approximately four years
after the public offering, the Board of Directors, upon the
recommendation of Hoyt, adopted a resolution amending
the Charter to create a class of non-voting stock. The
amendment was approved by the required two-thirds vote
of the stockholders. The issuance of non-voting stock
would have subjected Carter Products to delisting by the
Exchange.3
In an action filed in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City,
minority stockholders sought to enjoin the issuance of the
non-voting common stock. The court confined its examina-
tion of the issues to whether the statement of intent in the
prospectus constituted a continuing obligation to maintain
listing on the Exchange, and, whether the delisting was a
breach of a fiduciary duty, owing to the complainants as
minority stockholders. Judge Oppenheimer, in examining
the question of fiduciary duty, considered the delisting as
an act of waste, in view of the fact that the purpose behind
the issuance of the non-voting stock was the perpetuation
of Hoyt's majority control, as revealed by his own testi-
mony. The court found that the acts of waste constituted
a breach of fiduciary duty, and established its right to in-
tervene in the internal affairs of the corporation on the
ground that the action taken by the fiduciary was unfair to
the minority stockholder.'
The most formidable obstacle to establishing a con-
tractual relationship based on the statement of intent in
the prospectus was the alleged absence of privity of con-
tract between the contestants.5 The court avoided the
problem of privity by invoking the doctrine of promissory
estoppel, which recognizes that an obligation is created
when a promise is made with the intent of inducing reli-
ance, and the promisee, having acted in reliance, would be
substantially injured by the promisor's default. Delisting
might impair a corporation's ability to raise new capital
and injure the individual stockholder by a depreciation in
the market value of the stock. The court stated that the
2 CCH N.Y. Stock Exch. Guide 2499.10(3).
Winchell v. Plywood Corp., 85 N.E. 2d 313 (1949) ; Lebold v. Inland
S.S. Co., 82 F. 2d 351, 354 (7th Cir. 1936); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper
Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921) ; Elliott v. Baker, 80 N.E. 450 (1907).
5 The complainants had purchased their holdings directly from the under-
writers so that the necessary privity existed between them and not between
the plAintiffs and Carter Products.
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language in the prospectus constituted an implied promise
to continue listing on the Exchange as long as it was in the
best interests of the corporation, and concluded that Hoyt's
personal objective of perpetuating his majority control was
inconsistent with a "proper corporate reason".
Before Carter, the establishing of a contractual rela-
tionship by means of a prospectus was without precedent
in Maryland, and the only decision assigning such con-
tractual significance to a corporate prospectus was that
of the Supreme Court of Delaware in Salisbury v. Credit
Service, Inc.7 Through its agents the defendant corpora-
tion had issued a prospectus to the public which contained
a clause stating that a "customer market is maintained by
Credit Service, Inc., at 100 less 2% brokerage, after one
year from purchase."" The complainant bondholder pur-
chased the security on the representation in the prospectus
and brought suit when she was unable to sell the bonds
at the agreed price. The court held that the prospectus was
issued by the corporation's selling agents for the purpose
of promoting the bond issue, and the "language of the cus-
tomer market clause, if in any sense promissory in its
nature was . . . a part of the contract of sale." In effect,
the court concluded that the prospectus constituted an offer
of sale with a promise to maintain a specified market price
for the bond, and the purchase of the bond furnished the
necessary consideration and created a binding contract.
Moreover, the fact that the bonds had been sold to an inter-
mediary party and the prospectus issued through an agent
of the corporation did not prevent Credit Service, Inc., from
making a direct representation to the public.'0
In the Salisbury case, the words "a customer market is
maintained" were interpreted as a promise that the market
6 DAILY RECORD, September 23, 1963 (Md. 1963).
39 Del. 377, 199 Atl. 674 (1937).
8 Id. at 676.
Id. at 682-83.10The Carter prospectus was issued exclusively on behalf of the corpora-
tion with the authorized signatures of its officers. However, the holding of
the Delaware court is limited somewhat by the unique factual situation.
There, the court concluded that the close association between Credit
Service, Inc., and its intermediary, Credit Service Assoc., Inc., was sufficient
to constitute an agency relationship, even though the bonds had been sold
to the underwriter. In the instant case, the underwriters purchased the
issue, assuming full liability for the unsold stock. There was no evidence
that the underwriters were acting in an agency capacity. However, there
is another type of agreement between the underwriter and issuing corpora-
tion in which the former does not assume any liability but agrees only to
make a "best effort" to sell the stock. 2 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF
CoRPonAmoNs 1095 (5th ed. 1953). The "best effort" agreement might be
construed as a principal-agency relationship between issuing corporation
and underwriter, thereby giving even greater scope to the Salisbury decision.
UNITED FUNDS v. CARTER
"will be maintained". A similar clause was found in the
Carter prospectus in which the words "intends to make
application. . ." were held to constitute a promise that the
company would list its stock on the Exchange. In Carter,
the Maryland court went one step further in establishing
an implied promise that the listing would continue, based
on the general custom and usage of the trade.
There is no reason to treat the implied promise to con-
tinue listing as distinct from the promise to list on the
Exchange. If the intention of the company were to induce
the sale of stock, acquire the capital and delist as quickly
as possible, the issuing of non-voting stock clearly would
have constituted a fraudulent act. The Maryland court did
not find any evidence of fraud, but supported its conclu-
sion on the ground that the Carter Company was not
issuing the stock for a legitimate corporate purpose, and
thereby breached its implied contractual duty to continue
listing.
Although courts have not declined entirely to apply
the doctrine of promissory estoppel to commercial trans-
actions," it has been given its greatest recognition in cases
involving repudiation of promises of gratuities threatening
"substantial" injury to the party acting in reliance. 2 It is
applicable to transactions, either donative or commercial,
in which the only substantive basis for enforcing the
promise is the prevention of an injustice to the party acting
in reliance."
It may be questioned whether there is any need to in-
voke promissory estoppel to enforce a promise expressed
in a corporate prospectus. A prospectus, like the SEC
u Schafer v. Fraser, 206 Ore. 446, 290 P. 2d 190 (1955) ; Northwestern
Eng'r Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W. 2d 879, 884 (1943) ; Robert
Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F. 2d 654, 661 (7th Cir. 1941).
11 Annot., 48 A.L.R. 2d 1069 (1954). Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Require-
ments and IAmitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 469 (1950) ;
Boyer, Promissory Estoppet: Principle From Precedents: I, 50 MiCH. L.
REv. 639, 655 (1952).
uBoyer, supra note 12. See also, James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc.,
64 F. 2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933) ; Anderson v. Truitt, 158 Md. 193, 148 Atl.
223 (1930). In the Anderson case, the plaintiff purchased a two-thirds
interest in a furniture store from defendants, who owned the property as
tenants by the entirety. The parties entered into a covenant whereby the
original owners agreed to refrain from engaging in a business of a similar
nature within a specified period of time and geographical loction. In
answer to the defendant's contention that he had contracted only to the
extent of releasing his dower interest, the Maryland Court of Appeals held
that the promise was binding if, upon the flaith of it, the consideration is
parted with to another as beneficiary. The transaction in the Anderson
case was of a commercial nature, but the essential fact was the justifiable
reliance of the plaintiff on the promise of the covenantor, which the court
enforced in order to prevent an injustice.
1964]
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registration statement, emanates from the issuing corpora-
tion and contains the signatures of its representatives. The
contents of such a circular might range from a general
description of the stock to a specific offer of sale, but its
primary function is to encourage the reader to purchase
the security. When the prospectus constitutes an offer of
sale coupled with a specific promise, the subsequent pur-
chase of the security supplies the required consideration.
Under the Delaware view, the existence of an intermediary
party to purchase and distribute stock to the public does
not detract from the fact that the buyer understands the
prospectus to be a representation of the issuing company.
The Securities and Exchange Act provides some support
for this view.14
However, the lower court's application of the doctrine
of promissory estoppel has important ramifications. The
decision not only adopts the position that undertakings ex-
pressed in a prospectus can be enforced against the issuing
corporation by a purchaser of the stock offered, but also
provides an alternative method of establishing an enforc-
able obligation in situations wherein privity of contract is
somewhat attenuated.
The court's recognition of a contractual relationship
between the corporation and the stockholder raises a basic
question. Does the court's decision establish the stringent
requirement of unanimous stockholder approval of any
corporate act which might result in the delisting of its
stock? The lower court interpreted the statement of intent
in the prospectus as a promise that the company would list
on the Exchange, and maintain listing, unless "proper cor-
porate reason" justified the delisting.15 Therefore, the in-
dividual stockholder's right of recourse against the corpora-
tion for breach of contract does not rest merely on the fact
of delisting, but also necessitates evidence that the action,
which resulted in delisting, was instituted without "proper
corporate reason". In the instant case the court found that
the issuance of non-voting stock was achieved only for the
148 Stat. 74 § la (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1958). Although Section Ila
is concerned with the question of misrepresentation In a registration state-
ment or prospectus, the fundamental approach to the privity concept
appears to be applicable to the present situation. The statute extends
liability for misstatements to the parties affixing their signatures to the
statement, the underwriters, and any party who can be shown to be in
control of the aforementioned individuals. A leading authority on security
regulation has expressed the opinion that Section Ila provides the ultimate
investor with the right to sue both the issuing corporation and underwriter
where the prospectus has influenced the consumer's purchase. LOSS, op. cit.
supra note 2, §§ 1722, 1731, 1769.
DAILY REcoRD, September 23, 1963 (Md. 1963).
UNITED FUNDS v. CARTER
purpose of perpetuating control. But if the majority stock-
holder had acted in the best interests of the corporation,
there is every indication that the court would not have
intervened. The decision of the lower court does not pro-
vide the stockholder with unlimited power to obstruct a
course of action approved by two-thirds of the stockholders.
To the contrary, the burden of proof remains on the party
seeking to sustain a breach of contract that the defendants
were not acting in the interest of the corporation.
Since breach of the implied promise occurs only when
the delisting is without proper corporate purpose, the court
has, in effect read fiduciary duty into the contract. In each
case, therefore, the complainant must establish that the
course of action, resulting in corporate delisting, was not
in the best interests of the corporation and, thereby, consti-
tuted a breach of that duty. The absence of proper cor-
porate reason becomes the condition precedent to establish-
ing a breach of contract, and the contract action becomes
superfluous. The only apparent advantage to a contract
action over a derivative suit is the individual stockholder's
ability to sue directly rather than in behalf of the corpora-
tion, and this is outweighed by the need to establish not
only a breach of fiduciary duty, but also the basic ingredi-
ents of a contract. Even when a contract is established be-
tween the corporation and stockholder, there is serious
doubt as to the appropriateness of an individual suit in the
case of corporate delisting. While the individual stock-
holder may bring suit against the corporation or its direc-
tors in order to prevent or redress a wrongful act, the in-
jury must directly and peculiarly affect the complainant.'"
The only "substantial" injury in the present case sufficient
to satisfy the requirement of promissory estoppel, or in
any situation involving the delisting of stock, would be
the possible depreciation in market value of the security.
The Maryland court, however, has refused to recognize
depreciation of stock accruing from a wrongful act as a
basis for a personal action against the corporation or its
officials.' 7 When viewed in terms of the wasting of cor-
"Kohler v. McClellan, 77 F. Supp. 308, 313 (E.D. La. 1948); Wells v.
Dane, 101 Me. 67, 63 Ati. 324 (1905) ; 13 FLETCHHE, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORA-
TIONS §§ 5913, 5915 (rev. vol. 1961).
"Kohler v. McClellan, supra note 16; Waller v. Waller, 187 Md. 185, 189,
49 A. 2d 449 (1946) ; Wells v. Dane, 8upra note 16; 13 FLETCHER, Op. cit.
supra note 16, § 5913. The court in the Waller case stated: "It is a general
rule that an action at law to recover damages for an injury to a corpora-
tion can be brought only in the name of the corporation itself acting
through its directors, and not by an individual stockholder though the
injury may incidentally result in diminishing or destroying the value of
the stock. The reason for this rule is that the cause of action for injury
1964] 209
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIV
porate assets, the cause of action is exclusively the corpora-
tion's, without regard to an existing contractual relation-
ship between stockholder and corporation.18 In the Carter
case the more appropriate action would seem to have been
a derivative suit in behalf of the corporation. 9 This is
particularly important because of the limited situations in
which minority stockholders could prove that the injury
they allegedly suffered was not likewise experienced by
the other stockholders. The derivative suit appears to pro-
vide substantial advantage to the stockholder by eliminat-
ing the necessity for establishing privity of contract, and,
at the same time, by permitting the individual stockholder
to enjoin or redress the wrongful act.
While the holding of the Carter decision is faulty in
part, it does have the important effect of giving clear recog-
nition to the basic concept underlying Federal security
regulation: that the corporation and its representatives are
held to the highest standards of care and good faith in their
dealings with the public. The corporation is not only liable
for its misrepresentations, but is contractually bound by
the language of its prospectus where it is reasonably con-
strued as a statement of intent.
Guy B. MASERITZ
Qualifying Terms And Relief For Deficiency
In Quantity In Land Sales
Carozza v. Peacock Land Corp.'
The court appointed trustee for Peacock Land Corpora-
tion advertised a mortgage foreclosure sale, describing the
property as fronting approximately three hundred thirtyfeet on York Road in Baltimore County. Prior to the execu-
tion of the mortgage, a portion of the property had been
deeded to Baltimore County, with the result that the
trustee could only convey property fronting two hundred
twenty-six feet on York Road at the time of the sale.
,to the property of a corporation or for impairment or destruction of itsbusiness is in the corporation, and such an injury, although it may diminish
the ,alue of the capital stock, is not primarily or necessarily a damage to
the stockholder, and hence the stockholder's derivative right can be asserted
only through the corporation." Waller v. Waller, supra.
1B13 FLETCHim, aupra note 17.
' Id. § 5829.
'231 Md. 112, 188 A. 2d 917 (1963).
